|
Dissertation
Social Groups: What They Are and Why They Matter In my dissertation, I develop a framework that uses the tools of both contemporary metaphysics and metaethics to unify theories of groups as diverse as genders, governments, and guilds. I argue that, with it, we can account for basic social phenomena as important as social structure, social construction, and intersectionality. Though we tend not to notice them, social groups are everywhere. I encounter many every day, all of which systematically affect what I've reason to do. All else equal, I should speak with the barista from whom I order coffee, I should say Hello to the colleague I encounter on my way to the Department, and I should call my mother when I've a moment to spare. More than that they're everywhere, then, groups matter. But groups are puzzling. Pre-theoretically, groups are mere collections of individuals. Paradigmatic groups like the Boston Red Sox seem to be “them,” they seem to be “it.” If groups are the individuals that are their members, however, they have their members necessarily. But, of course, they don’t. David Ortiz both used to be and might not have been a member of the Boston Red Sox. As a result, the view that groups are pluralities is wildly unpopular. In my dissertation, I defend it. In particular, in Chapter 1, I defend an account of groups according to which groups are pluralities of social roles that are individuated by whatever functional kinds define them. I call it Functionalist Pluralism (FP). I argue that alternative accounts of groups, according to which they're singular entities, are incompatible with the plausible view that groups are individuated by the social systems in which they’re embedded, and that FP gets it right. In Chapter 2, I defend FP by developing and defending an account of social roles. According to my account, roles are Aristotelian compounds; particular individuals are their “matter,” and particular normative arrangements – specified by the functions particular groups realize – are their "form." I argue that this account provides a compelling response to an influential objection to Aristotelianism; namely, that it “overcounts." Lastly, in Chapter 3, I defend a necessary condition on social construction: X is socially constructed only if it's grounded in facts concerning more natural social kinds. I argue that whereas it captures the sense in which groups are constructed, alternative accounts of construction don't. Lastly, I show that it paves the way for a general account of structured social systems with the potential to unify important areas of social metaphysics. |
Publications
Social Construction, Social Kinds, and Exportation. Forthcoming in Analysis Recently, Brian Epstein (2015, 2019) has argued that social kinds “export” across worlds. Although the conditions for war criminality aren’t "fixed" in the Empire, for instance, Darth Vader is a war criminal there. Moreover, he argues that "grounding-only" accounts of social construction – like those endorsed by Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 2019) and Aaron Griffith (2018 a, b) – entail that social kinds don’t export across worlds. As a result, he claims that we need more than grounding; in particular, that we need both grounding and what he calls “anchoring.” In this paper, I argue that once we draw an important distinction between what I call "thick" and "thin" social kinds, Epstein’s argument either equivocates or is compatible with grounding-only accounts of social construction Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups. Forthcoming in Dialectica It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups – the view that groups are pluralities – is incompatible with the following: a group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and different groups can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). In this paper, I argue that “the arguments from Difference and Sameness” are unsound. First, I articulate a functionalist account of what it is to be a group that’s neutral with respect to pluralism and its primary opponent, monism. According to the version of functionalist pluralism I propose, groups are pluralities of roles. Second, I argue that because different individuals can play a role both at different times and in different worlds, and because the same individuals can play different roles at the same times and in the same worlds, functionalist pluralism is invulnerable to the arguments from Difference and Sameness. Lastly, I argue that functionalist pluralism is superior to functionalist monism with respect to how groups are individuated; in particular, by the structured social systems in which they’re embedded. In the process, I hope to have shown that functionalism – whether pluralistic or monistic – is worthy of our attention. What Social Construction Isn't. Philosophia 49(4): 1651-1670 (2021) Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view that construction is ground that's endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider different versions of the view that construction is ground and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant accounts of its relevance are inadequate. Under Review A paper about the metaphysics of groups. |
Works in Progress
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability
The plausible view that groups generate reasons for their members recommends a plausible account of intersectionality. In particular, if membership in multiple groups is characterized by various forms of rational pressure, we can say that groups intersect in the sense that the reasons they generate are, like all reasons, recombinable. Importantly, this account captures the sense in which intersectionality isn’t “additive.” Moreover, it vindicates Kimberlee Crenshaw (1993)’s conception of intersectionality in explaining how membership in multiple groups might recommend actions that ultimately rationalize oppression.
The Metaphysics of Economic Class (with Dan Lowe)
Six Degrees of USD's: Holistic Social Structure
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability
The plausible view that groups generate reasons for their members recommends a plausible account of intersectionality. In particular, if membership in multiple groups is characterized by various forms of rational pressure, we can say that groups intersect in the sense that the reasons they generate are, like all reasons, recombinable. Importantly, this account captures the sense in which intersectionality isn’t “additive.” Moreover, it vindicates Kimberlee Crenshaw (1993)’s conception of intersectionality in explaining how membership in multiple groups might recommend actions that ultimately rationalize oppression.
The Metaphysics of Economic Class (with Dan Lowe)
Six Degrees of USD's: Holistic Social Structure
