Publications
Social Construction, Social Kinds, and Exportation. Forthcoming in Analysis
Recently, Brian Epstein (2015, 2019) has argued that social kinds “export” across worlds. Although the conditions for war criminality aren’t "fixed" in the Empire, for instance, Darth Vader is a war criminal there. Moreover, he argues that "grounding-only" accounts of social construction – like those endorsed by Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 2019) and Aaron Griffith (2018 a, b) – entail that social kinds don’t export across worlds. As a result, he claims that we need more than grounding; in particular, that we need both grounding and what he calls “anchoring.” In this paper, I argue that once we draw an important distinction between what I call "thick" and "thin" social kinds, Epstein’s argument either equivocates or is compatible with grounding-only accounts of social construction
Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups. Forthcoming in Dialectica
It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups – the view that groups are pluralities – is incompatible with the following: a group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and different groups can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). In this paper, I argue that “the arguments from Difference and Sameness” are unsound. First, I articulate a functionalist account of what it is to be a group that’s neutral with respect to pluralism and its primary opponent, monism. According to the version of functionalist pluralism I propose, groups are pluralities of roles. Second, I argue that because different individuals can play a role at both different times and in different worlds, and because the same individual can play different roles at both the same times and in the same worlds, functionalist pluralism is invulnerable to the arguments from Difference and Sameness. Lastly, I argue that functionalist pluralism is superior to functionalist monism with respect to how groups are individuated; in particular, by the structured social systems in which they’re embedded. In the process, I hope to have shown that functionalism – whether pluralistic or monistic – is worthy of our attention.
What Social Construction Isn't. Philosophia 49(4): 1651-1670 (2021)
Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view that construction is ground that's endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider different versions of the view that construction is ground and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant accounts of its relevance are inadequate.
Under Review
[1] A paper about the metaphysics of groups
[2] A paper about the metaphysics of social construction
Social Construction, Social Kinds, and Exportation. Forthcoming in Analysis
Recently, Brian Epstein (2015, 2019) has argued that social kinds “export” across worlds. Although the conditions for war criminality aren’t "fixed" in the Empire, for instance, Darth Vader is a war criminal there. Moreover, he argues that "grounding-only" accounts of social construction – like those endorsed by Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 2019) and Aaron Griffith (2018 a, b) – entail that social kinds don’t export across worlds. As a result, he claims that we need more than grounding; in particular, that we need both grounding and what he calls “anchoring.” In this paper, I argue that once we draw an important distinction between what I call "thick" and "thin" social kinds, Epstein’s argument either equivocates or is compatible with grounding-only accounts of social construction
Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups. Forthcoming in Dialectica
It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups – the view that groups are pluralities – is incompatible with the following: a group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and different groups can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). In this paper, I argue that “the arguments from Difference and Sameness” are unsound. First, I articulate a functionalist account of what it is to be a group that’s neutral with respect to pluralism and its primary opponent, monism. According to the version of functionalist pluralism I propose, groups are pluralities of roles. Second, I argue that because different individuals can play a role at both different times and in different worlds, and because the same individual can play different roles at both the same times and in the same worlds, functionalist pluralism is invulnerable to the arguments from Difference and Sameness. Lastly, I argue that functionalist pluralism is superior to functionalist monism with respect to how groups are individuated; in particular, by the structured social systems in which they’re embedded. In the process, I hope to have shown that functionalism – whether pluralistic or monistic – is worthy of our attention.
What Social Construction Isn't. Philosophia 49(4): 1651-1670 (2021)
Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view that construction is ground that's endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider different versions of the view that construction is ground and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant accounts of its relevance are inadequate.
Under Review
[1] A paper about the metaphysics of groups
[2] A paper about the metaphysics of social construction
Projects
What is Social Structure?
What is a Social Role?
The Metaphysics of Economic Class (with Dan Lowe)
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability
What is a Double-Bind?
What is Social Structure?
What is a Social Role?
The Metaphysics of Economic Class (with Dan Lowe)
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability
What is a Double-Bind?