Publications
Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups. Forthcoming in Dialectica
It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups – the view that groups are pluralities – is incompatible with the following: a group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and different groups can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). In this paper, I argue that “the arguments from Difference and Sameness” are unsound. First, I articulate a functionalist account of what it is to be a group that’s neutral with respect to pluralism and its primary opponent, monism. According to the version of functionalist pluralism I propose, groups are pluralities of roles. Second, I argue that because different individuals can play a role at both different times and in different worlds, and because the same individual can play different roles at both the same times and in the same worlds, functionalist pluralism is invulnerable to the arguments from Difference and Sameness. Lastly, I argue that functionalist pluralism is superior to functionalist monism with respect to how groups are individuated; in particular, by the structured social systems in which they’re embedded. In the process, I hope to have shown that functionalism – whether pluralistic or monistic – is worthy of our attention.
Social Construction, Social Kinds, and Exportation. Analysis 84(1): 83-93 (2023)
Recently, Brian Epstein (2015, 2019) has argued that social kinds “export” across worlds. Although the conditions for war criminality aren’t "fixed" in the Empire, for instance, Darth Vader is a war criminal there. Moreover, he argues that "grounding-only" accounts of social construction – like those endorsed by Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 2019) and Aaron Griffith (2018 a, b) – entail that social kinds don’t export across worlds. As a result, he claims that we need more than grounding; in particular, that we need both grounding and what he calls “anchoring.” In this paper, I argue that once we draw an important distinction between what I call "thick" and "thin" social kinds, Epstein’s argument either equivocates or is compatible with grounding-only accounts of social construction.
What Social Construction Isn't. Philosophia 49(4): 1651-1670 (2021)
Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view that construction is ground that's endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider different versions of the view that construction is ground and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant accounts of its relevance are inadequate.
Under Review
[1] A paper about the metaphysics of social construction.
[2] A paper about the metaphysics of social reality.
Projects
Unified Social Holism: A paper that articulates and defends a distinctive form of social holism.
Thick Social Kinds (with Aaron Griffith): A paper that articulates a distinctive modal feature of social phenomena, and argues that we should understand it in terms of the natures of certain social kinds.
Euthyphronic Explanation: A paper that argues there are explanations with one causal arc and one non-causal arc.
On Constraints and Enablements: A paper that uses a reasons framework to generate an account of constraints and enablements.
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability: A paper that argues we should understand intersectionality in terms of a structural feature of group-generated reasons.
The Metaphysics of Socioeconomic Class (with Dan Lowe): A paper that articulates and defends a distinctive account of socioeconomic class.
Unified Social Holism: A paper that articulates and defends a distinctive form of social holism.
Thick Social Kinds (with Aaron Griffith): A paper that articulates a distinctive modal feature of social phenomena, and argues that we should understand it in terms of the natures of certain social kinds.
Euthyphronic Explanation: A paper that argues there are explanations with one causal arc and one non-causal arc.
On Constraints and Enablements: A paper that uses a reasons framework to generate an account of constraints and enablements.
Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability: A paper that argues we should understand intersectionality in terms of a structural feature of group-generated reasons.
The Metaphysics of Socioeconomic Class (with Dan Lowe): A paper that articulates and defends a distinctive account of socioeconomic class.
