

EMILIE PAGANO

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AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION: Metaphysics, Social philosophy

AREAS OF COMPETENCE: Feminist philosophy, Political philosophy, Moral philosophy (particularly, Meta-ethics)

EDUCATION

2016-2023 (expected)

Ph.D. in Philosophy
University of Texas at Austin

DISSERTATION: *Social Groups: What They Are and Why They Matter*

COMMITTEE: Rob Koons (chair), David Sosa, Jon Litland, Kate Ritchie (University of California at Irvine), Aaron Griffith (College of William and Mary), and Robbie Kubala

2014-2016

M.A. in Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder

2015-2016

Graduate Certificate in Women and Gender Studies

SUPERVISOR: Alison Jaggar

PUBLICATIONS

[3] R&R at *Analysis*

[2] "Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups." *Forthcoming in Dialectica*

[1] "What Social Construction Isn't." *Philosophia* 49(4): 1651-70 (2021)

UNDER REVIEW

A paper about the metaphysics of groups.

IN PROGRESS

"The Metaphysics of Social Roles"

“The Metaphysics of Economic Class” (with Dan Lowe)
“Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability”

FELLOWSHIPS AND WORKSHOPS

2023	Metaphysical Mayhem
2022	David Bruton Junior Graduate School Fellowship, \$1,000 Summer Travel Fellowship \$2,000
2021	Graduate School Dissertation Fellowship, \$10,000
2019	Conference on Grounding and its Applications Fellowship, \$1,000
2017	Social Ontology Workshop Central European University
2016	Recruitment Fellowship, \$10, 000 Royal Fellowship, \$2,000 per year

CONFERENCES

2022	“A Functionalist Account of Groups” International Society for Social Philosophy “The Metaphysics of Class (with Dan Lowe)” [1] National Society for Social Philosophy [2] International Society for Social Philosophy
2020	“Intersectionality as Reasons Recombinability” National Society for Social Philosophy

INVITED TALKS

2022	“What Social Construction Isn’t” Central European University
2020	“Can Metaphysics Be Feminist?” Brigham Young University

COMMENTS

2022	“A Truthmaking Account of Social Construction”
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Aaron Griffith (College of William and Mary)
Social Metaphysics Workshop

2019 “The Meaning of Life Extension”
Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (Sam Houston State University)
Texas Ethics Workshop

2017 “Do Normative Laws Ground or Govern?”
Derek Haderlie (Brigham Young University)
University of Texas at Austin Graduate Conference

2016 “Conciliationism and Debunking: A Reply to
Bogardus”
Alex Grossman (University of Texas at Austin)
Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference

INSTRUCTOR OF RECORD

2023 Philosophy of Film

2021 Political Philosophy

2020 [1] Human Nature

[2] Contemporary Moral Problems

TEACHING ASSISTANT

2022 [1] Race and Gender

[2] Introduction to Philosophy of the Arts

2021 Human Nature

2020 Contemporary Moral Problems

2019 [1] Human Nature

[2] Existentialism

2018 Medical Ethics

2017 Introduction to Ethics

SERVICE

I’VE IDENTIFIED CLIMATE AND DIVERSITY-RELATED SERVICE WITH
***asterisks.**

2020-Present	*Texas Prison Education Initiative (via Extension School) Instructor
2018-Present	*Compass: An Undergraduate Philosophy Workshop Instructor
2017-Present	*Feminist Philosophy Reading Group Organizer
2022	Philosophy and Fiction Reading Group Organizer
2020-2021	*Actions that Promote Community Transformation Co-organizer
2019-2020	*Compass: An Undergraduate Philosophy Workshop Organizer
2018-2019	Royal Ethics Conference Co-organizer
	Graduate Student Representative
2017-2018	[1] *Corrupt the Youth (CTY) Co-director
	[2] *Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Undergraduate Liaison
	[3] Meta-ethics Reading Group Organizer
	[4] Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks Co-organizer
2016-2017	*Corrupt the Youth (CTY) Instructor

REFERENCES

Rob Koons

David Sosa

Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
University of Texas at Austin

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Professor of Philosophy

University of Texas at Austin

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Jon Litland

Associate Professor of Philosophy
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Aaron Griffith

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Robbie Kubala (teaching)

Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of Texas at Austin

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Though we tend not to notice them, social groups are everywhere. And though we tend not to notice it, social groups matter. My interactions with the social groups I encounter systematically affect what I've reason to do. All else equal, I *should* speak with the barista, I *should* say *Hello* to my colleague, and I *should* call my mother.

But groups are puzzling. Pre-theoretically, groups are mere collections of individuals. Paradigmatic groups like the Boston Red Sox seem to *be* "them," they seem to *be* "it." If groups are the individuals that are their members, however, they have their members necessarily. But, of course, they don't. David Ortiz both used to be and might not have been a member of the Boston Red Sox, for instance. As a result, the pre-theoretical view of groups has been widely rejected.

My dissertation articulates a metaphysical framework for theorizing about what groups are that I argue vindicates this pre-theoretical view, both metaphysically and normatively.

In Chapter 1, I articulate an account of groups according to which groups are pluralities of social roles that realize functional kinds. I call it Functionalist Pluralism. I argue that the view that groups are singular entities is incompatible with the view that groups are individuated by the social systems in which they're embedded, something that Functionalist Pluralism gets right.

In Chapter 2, I develop the account of groups I defend in Chapter 1 by articulating an account of roles. According to this account, roles are Aristotelian compounds: particular individuals are their "matter," and particular normative arrangements – specified by functions that define the kinds in question – are their "form." I argue that this account provides a compelling response to an influential objection to Aristotelianism; namely, that it "overcounts." Rather than count individuals, it counts normative arrangements.

Lastly, in Chapter 3, I argue for an account of social construction according to which to be socially constructed is to be a fact concerning a social kind that's grounded in a fact concerns a more natural social kind. Moreover, I argue that this account is superior to accounts that have been articulated in the literature. In particular, I argue that whereas my account captures the sense in which groups are constructed, the other accounts either don't or can't.